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ADDRESSES

REMARKS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST*

It is a great pleasure to be here with all of you this evening to participate in the Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice
sponsored by the Brookings Institution. Two years ago when we met
in Charlottesville, I mentioned several issues of importance to the judiciary, and am happy to see that in the past two years Congress has
enacted a number of measures to improve the administration of justice. The judiciary is grateful for these laws, but as they say, judicial
reform is no sport for the short-winded. More remains to be done.
This evening I wish to talk about the future of the federal court
system.
Just about a century ago, the noted American historian Frederick
Jackson Turner, in a seminal article, proclaimed the disappearance of
the American frontier. Studying the patterns of westward migration
in this country, he concluded that the supply of free or relatively
cheap land, which had encouraged debt-ridden Americans and wave
after wave of immigrants to settle the west, had been exhausted. In
my view, a similar situation obtains today with respect to the federal
court system. There is virtually no unused capacity in the system as it
presently exists, and the difficulties of creating substantial additional
capacity counsel caution, to say the least, in attempting it. We are in
a position where we must think not about creating new federal causes
of action, but of remitting to state courts some of the business now
* Chief Justice of the United States. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered this address at
the Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institute
on Friday, April 7, 1989.
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handled by the federal courts. In a moment I will nominate a couple
of candidates which I think deserve remittance to the state courts.
This operation of the judiciary at full capacity is a development
which has occurred since the time I was admitted to the practice of
law thirty-five years ago. Early in this century, the American humorist Finley Peter Dunne, writing under the pen name of "Mr. Dooley,"
referred to a judge he knew in these words:
"'E's got a good judicial temperament. 'E' don't like work."
There may have been some of this attitude in evidence among
judges at the time I came to the bar in the 1950s, though I think it was
not so much from laziness as from lack of a full docket. But the situation has changed dramatically in the intervening years. The average
federal judge works hard at his job, and the judiciary has taken every
practicable step that I can think of to increase its output. Federal
courts rely on computer assistance to a degree inconceivable even ten
years ago; federal judges now have more law clerks than at any time
in our history. Congress has increased the number of judges, and has
upgraded what used to be referees in bankruptcy to bankruptcy
judges. The United States Magistrates authorized by Congress are
widely used as auxiliary judges at the trial level.
The Judicial Conference has requested the creation of additional
judgeships just to restore the judiciary to the position it was in a few
years ago, and I am hopeful that Congress will take action on this
request. But I do not think Congress would favor an indefinite expansion of the number of federal judges to keep up with an ever-increasing case load, and I don't think that simply adding new judgeships
would be a wise development from the point of view of the judiciary.
Therefore, when we look at the long run we must keep in mind two
things: first, future Congresses are not going to cheerfully forego the
authority to create new federal causes of action, an authority which
has been exercised by past Congresses without number; second, those
interested in the administration of justice in the federal courts should
therefore concern themselves now with cutting back on federal jurisdiction in some areas.
Many types of lawsuits which can be brought in the federal courts
have a distinctly "federal" flavor: prosecutions for federal crimes;
civil antitrust actions; claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; claims brought under Section 1983. I
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know of no substantial body of opinion which favors the relinquishment of this sort of federal jurisdiction to state courts.
But with respect to two types of actions which may be presently
brought in the federal courts, I think a strong case may be made for at
least modification if not repeal. The first of these is diversity jurisdiction, and the second is civil RICO.
Diversity jurisdiction, of course, is the authority by which federal
courts hear cases that don't involve any sort of federal law claim, but
in which the plaintiff is a citizen of one state and the defendant of
another. It was provided for in the Constitution, and enacted by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, because of concern that an out-of-state litigant
would suffer prejudice at the hands of a local judge and jury in a state
court.

Very learned people have debated back and forth whether so-called
"diversity" jurisdiction in the federal courts is needed today in the
way it was needed at the time it was created by the Judiciary Act of
1789. I do not propose in my brief remarks tonight to take sides in
this controversy. We have had diversity jurisdiction for two hundred
years, although Congress has over the years repeatedly modified the
basis for it: last year the amount in controversy requirement was
raised to $50,000.
But there is one part of diversity jurisdiction as it now stands that I
think is very difficult to justify, and which accounts for a very substantial number of the cases filed in the federal district courts. That is
the part allowing the resident plaintiff who starts a lawsuit and who is
a resident, say, of the state of Virginia, to sue in a federal court in
Virginia, rather than a state court, simply because it names as the
defendant in its lawsuit an out-of-state person or corporation who is
not a resident of Virginia. Whatever may be the arguments for maintaining diversity jurisdiction with respect to an out-of-state plaintiff
who sues an in-state defendant in Virginia, few would seem to support
the idea that there will be local prejudice against an in-state plaintiff,
and therefore, that he should be entitled to take advantage of filing in
federal court. If the in-state plaintiff sues in state court, then, under
existing law, the out-of-state defendant-the party that could suffer
prejudice against "foreigners"-may remove the case to federal court.
But there is no reason for letting the plaintiff start out in federal court.
Each year approximately 71,000 cases based on diversity of citizenship are filed in federal court. Repeal of the right of an in-state plaintiff to take advantage of this jurisdiction would probably cut this
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number in half, and afford a marked and noticeable decrease in district court filings.
Some bar associations, and indeed some federal judges, oppose even
this sort of limitation on diversity jurisdiction, but when the reasons
for their opposition are analyzed they are singularly unpersuasive.
The lawyers say either that they prefer to have a choice of two courts
in which to file such suits, or that they think the judges in the federal
courts are better than the judges in the state courts. The judges say
that they find diversity cases more interesting to try than many lawsuits based on federal law, and that diversity jurisdiction brings many
lawyers into federal court who would not otherwise be there. But
there is simply no reason for federal taxpayers to furnish federal
courts for the trial of cases which have no reason for being in federal
court. If the lawyers in a particular state believe the judges of that
state are less able than their counterparts in the federal courts, they
should take the necessary action to secure the upgrading of their own
state judiciary. And if some federal judges really prefer trying cases
based entirely on state law, perhaps they would be happier as state
court judges.
If the nation were wondering how to spend a budget surplus, or if
Congress were eager to create new federal judgeships, these reasons
might be sufficient to support the retention of a kind of jurisdiction
which we have had for a number of years. But we all know that appropriated funds are in very short supply for the judiciary, as for the
rest of the government, and that there is little sentiment in or out of
Congress to create a large number of new judgeships. That being the
case, the arguments in favor of retaining diversity jurisdiction for the
benefit of resident plaintiffs are, in my opinion, quite insufficient.
I think the situation is roughly comparable to the sort of commuter
railroad that runs on the old B&O tracks from Harper's Ferry, West
Virginia, some fifty miles into Union Station in downtown Washington. Its purpose is to serve commuters who live far outside the range
of the bus and subway system that serves metropolitan Washington.
But when the line starts up, the train is only half full with passengers
from the outlying areas. The railroad, in order to increase revenue,
decides to start picking up passengers in the nearby suburbs of Washington-Takoma Park and Silver Spring-even though these people
are served by the subway and bus systems.
So far, so good. The railroad has made a sensible economic decision. But now time passes, the population in the outlying areas grows
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and the train is full by the time it gets to the nearby suburbs. Do you
put on a second train to accommodate the close-in passengers? If
you're in private business, the answer is yes; you have a good product,
you make more money by increasing sales. But if you're the government, and operate at a substantial loss, the answer is no. The purpose
of the line is to serve people who can't be served by other forms of
mass transit, and you accomplish that purpose with only one train.
The second train would serve only people who already have alternate transportation available. The fact that these passengers think the
train is more comfortable than the bus, or that the conductors on the
train are higher type people than those on the bus, shouldn't make
any difference. And the fact that the conductors on the train think
that the close-in passengers are a better class clientele than the ones
who got on at Harper's Ferry shouldn't make any difference either.
Maybe these conductors should switch to driving the buses. I hope
that Congress will seriously consider eliminating this aspect of diversity jurisdiction.
Now let me turn to civil RICO. Civil filings under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law have increased more than
eight-fold over the last five years, to nearly a thousand cases during
calendar year 1988. While that number has held somewhat steady
during the past three years, there is every reason to think that we can
expect a substantial increase in this already high number because of
the statute's lucrative treble damages provisions and the extensive
coverage recently afforded civil RICO actions by the national media,
legal publications, and continuing legal education programs.
Virtually everyone who has addressed the question agrees that civil
RICO is now being used in ways that Congress never intended when
it enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the civil suits filed under the
statute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are gardenvariety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state
courts. Why does the statute work this way? In part, because it creates a civil counterpart for criminal wire fraud and mail fraud prosecutions. It does this by stating that acts indictable under those
provisions, as well as many other types of criminal acts, are capable of
establishing the "pattern of racketeering" which is the predicate for a
civil RICO action.
Whether it is a good idea to have a civil counterpart for wire fraud
and mail fraud is at least open to question, it seems to me, quite apart
from the question whether treble damages should be awarded. When
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the mail fraud statute was originally enacted in 1872 as a part of a
routine revision of the postal code, it generated no congressional debate or other legislative history explaining its purpose. Since then
scholars have expressed the view that its intent was to reach swindlers
and defrauders who fell outside the scope of "rudimentary criminal
codes, conceived for rural societies and confined by state lines and
local considerations." Similarly, when the wire fraud statute was initially passed eighty years later in 1952 it served to establish a parallel
offense to mail fraud and thereby close a "loophole ... in the law,"
which left citizens and licensees at "the mercy of some clever
schemer."
With the growth of long distance communication and technology,
mail fraud and wire fraud-which applies to all telephone calls-have
a much wider sweep now than they did when the statutes were enacted. On the criminal side this greater breadth is kept under control
by the use of prosecutorial discretion by United States attorneys.
They concentrate on the fraudulent schemes which are either too big
or too widespread for efficient state prosecution. Garden-variety
frauds and swindles are left to the state courts.
But there is no such thing as prosecutorial discretion to limit the
use of civil RICO by plaintiffs' attorneys. Any good lawyer who can
bring himself within the terms of the federal civil RICO provisions
will sue in federal court because of the prospect of treble damages and
attorney's fees which civil RICO holds out. So the question must be
asked whether the kinds of frauds and swindles that have been held to
come under civil RICO are really the sort of things that Congress
intended to bring into the federal courts when it passed that statute in
1970. And, if not, should not this statute be at least modified?
The legislative history of the RICO Act strongly suggests that Congress never intended that civil RICO should be used, as it is today, in
ordinary commercial disputes far divorced from the influences of organized crime. The legislative package which included RICO
originated in the Senate. Although earlier proposals had contained
treble damages provisions, no such terms were included in the bill
which passed the Senate; its civil remedies were limited to injunctive
actions by the United States. During hearings on the Senate bill
before the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Steiger proposed the addition of a private treble damages action "similar to the
private damage remedy found in the antitrust laws." He believed that
"those wronged by organized crime should at least be given access to a

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss1/2

6

Rehnquist: Address.

1989]

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND CIVIL RICO

legal remedy." The House Committee approved the proposed amendment, and when the bill was summarized on the House floor, its sponsor echoed the view that the amended provisions were intended to be
a weapon in the war against organized crime. He described the treble
damages provisions as "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for 'use against organized criminality.'" The amended
bill was passed by the House. The Senate did not seek a conference,
and adopted the House version. However, while the legislation was
still pending before the House, Senator McClellan, the bill's Senate
sponsor, expressed the view that the new treble damages provisions
would be "a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of
organized crime in our economic life."
Notwithstanding the new legislation's expressed purpose of seeking
"the eradication of organized crime in the United States," the RICO
provisions did not specifically refer to organized crime, because of the
difficulty of defining that activity and because it was believed that requiring proof that a defendant fell within such a definition would
handicap efforts to achieve the remedial objectives of the law. Consequently, the statute was intentionally written in general terms so as to
permit flexible application.
In its present form, civil RICO has a tremendous reach. For example, civil RICO claims have been raised in actions relating to divorce,
trespass, legal and accounting malpractice, inheritance among family
members, employment benefits, and sexual harassment by a union.
As Justice Byron White wrote for our Court in 1985, notwithstanding
Congress' use of "self-consciously expansive language" RICO, "in its
private civil version ...is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors."
In one case, elderly "life care" residents of a religious retirement
community claimed that the owner had used fraud to induce them to
sign contracts and had mismanaged community finances. Because the
owner was judgment-proof, the residents relied on a clause in the
RICO statute which permits actions not only against the owners or
operators of a criminal enterprise, but against persons "associated"
with it. Among others, they sued the Prudential Insurance Company,
the community's mortgagee, and ultimately secured a large settlement
from Prudential.
In another suit, civil RICO was invoked in an effort which some
have described as standing labor law on its head. A bus company,
which suffered property damage and lost profits during a strike by
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employees, claimed that a union official had threatened several times
to inflict property damage on it, and had once threatened to burn
company buses. The company alleged that this constituted extortion,
a "racketeering activity" under RICO, and that the union was therefore attempting to influence the company's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity. A federal appeals court panel held that the
case could go to trial.
More recently, civil RICO was employed to hold 26 protesters at
an abortion clinic in Philadelphia liable for more than $100,000 in
damages and attorneys fees. Numerous similar cases are pending.
RICO's treble damages provisions create a powerful incentive for
attorneys to attempt to bring facts traditionally thought to establish
other causes of action within the ambit of the statute. For example, in
1988, in the first successful use of RICO in a wrongful discharge case,
the trial court's award rose to $43 million when trebled.
Proposals for curtailing civil RICO have been introduced in the last
three Congresses. Suggested reforms range from the complete abolition of all civil RICO actions to more modest modifications. Among
the latter are the restriction or abolition of treble damages, the imposition of a prior criminal conviction or special injury requirement, and
the denial of relief where the predicate illegality is confined to ordinary fraud. Others have suggested that civil RICO plaintiffs should
be required to prove that the alleged racketeers derived pecuniary
gain from the activity. This would allow the statute to apply to runof-the-mill organized crime figures, but would exclude more altruistically motivated persons, such as political protesters. Some reformers
urge that the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement be redefined to necessitate proof of on-going criminal activity, rather than
two unrelated criminal incidents. This, they say, would narrow the
net of potential liability while still allowing civil RICO to strike
against criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses and labor unions.
Some individuals have even suggested that in view of RICO's treble
damages provisions, the statute should be amended to allow for
equally generous sanctions for frivolous claims.
I take no position as to which of the reform proposals are acceptable or which is best, but I do think that the imposition of some limitations on civil RICO actions is required so that federal courts are not
required to duplicate the efforts of the state courts. No one doubts
that the victim of a fraudulent scheme should be able to obtain redress
in a court. The question is under what circumstances should that take
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place in afederal court? Overlapping criminal remedies do not present much of a problem, because state and federal prosecutions tend to
work things out on a sensible basis of resource allocation. But there is
no such control in the case of overlapping civil remedies. Plaintiffs
make the choice that best suits their interests, and if treble damages
are available in federal court, but not in state court, the cases will
gravitate to the former.
Each of the three branches-through court opinions, legislative
proposals, or submissions to Congress-has recently expressed recognition of the need for reforming civil RICO. I think that the time has
arrived for Congress to enact amendments to civil RICO to limit its
scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to organized crime, or
have some other reason for being in federal court.
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